Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat Information with Radioactive Materials Operators by Duguay, Raphael
International Journal of Nuclear Security 
Volume 6 Number 1 Article 8 
7-6-2020 
Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat Information with 
Radioactive Materials Operators 
Raphael Duguay 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Duguay, Raphael (2020) "Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat Information with Radioactive 
Materials Operators," International Journal of Nuclear Security: Vol. 6: No. 1, Article 8. 
https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060108 
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns/vol6/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals), 
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted 
for inclusion in International Journal of Nuclear Security by an authorized editor. For more information, please visit 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns. 
Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat Information with Radioactive 
Materials Operators 
Cover Page Footnote 
The author wish to acknowledge the valued contributions and comments from Ali El-Jaby, Jodi Peloquin, 
Michael Beaudette, Patrick Adams, Craig Thompson, Fred Morris and Chris Englefield. 
This article is available in International Journal of Nuclear Security: https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns/vol6/iss1/8 








Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat 





Senior Security Advisor, Nuclear Security Division 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 
 
 





Operators are required to implement security measures to address requirements set by the regulatory 
body or competent authority. These security requirements are generally based on the national threat 
level and information provided by the relevant law enforcement authority, intelligence agencies, and 
other relevant stakeholders. However, not all States can share this information with those who hold 
radioactive materials  (e.g., operators), especially if they take a more prescriptive approach to regulation 
on security. The same situation often exists when a performance-based approach is used because there 
are multiple barriers that restrict the competent authority from sharing threat information. For 
example, competent authorities need to protect confidentiality and comply with national laws, 
regulations, and other information security considerations. In this paper, the author presents some 
challenges and opportunities relevant to exchanging threat information. The objective is to reflect on 
current practices, including good practices at the state and operator levels, to facilitate cooperation 
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between regulatory bodies and operators. The purpose is to increase awareness about the threats and 
techniques used by adversaries and to assist stakeholders in maintaining vigilance without 
compromising the security and confidentiality of the information. 
1. Introduction 
When protecting high-risk radioactive materials against malicious actors, it is important to implement 
security measures that are based on threats and potential consequences following a graded approach in 
relation to the overall level of risk. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed a set 
of recommendations and guidance documents to help Member States develop and implement a nuclear 
security regime to adequately manage the safety and security of radioactive materials. Based on the 
IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (“The Code of Conduct”) [1], 
every state should define its domestic threats and assess their vulnerability with respect to the various 
materials used in the country. However, there are several challenges in sharing threat information. 
Some of these issues are related to confidentiality, the need to protect national security or trade 
secrets, and compliance with national privacy laws, regulations, policies, and directives. In addition, 
there are legal protection concerns such as copyrights, trademarks, and the general fear of losing 
control of the information. To share this type of sensitive information, the competent authority needs 
the consent of the owner as well as assurances from the receiver that they will not disclose this 
information without proper authorization. This last criterion often is harder to achieve because 
organizations need to develop and implement contractual arrangements and maintain trusting 
relationships will the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, it takes time, human and financial resources, and 
the will to work in collaboration with other stakeholders. In this paper, the author presents some 
challenges and opportunities to facilitate sharing threat information between regulatory bodies and 
operators. The objective is to enhance and strengthen awareness on current and evolving threats and 
techniques used by adversaries and to assist stakeholders in being better prepared to address the 
threats without compromising national security and confidentiality.  
This paper focuses on the nuclear industry, and in particular, operators that use, store, and transport 
high-risk radioactive materials. It excludes nuclear power plants and other high security nuclear facilities 
because these operators usually have more resources to assess threats to their facilities and operations 
as well as established communication networks with government organizations, law enforcement 
agencies, and other intelligence security services. In this paper, the author assumes that the regulatory 
body is involved in the development of the domestic threat statement for the variety of radioactive 
materials used within its territory. 
 
2. Definitions from IAEA Nuclear Security Series 
• Representative threat statement (RTS): A description of the motivations, intentions, and 
capabilities of potential adversaries that are less rigorous and formal than the approach used to 
establish a design basis threat [2]. 
• Competent authority: A governmental organization or institution that has been designated by a 
state to carry out one or more nuclear security functions. For example, competent authorities 
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include regulatory bodies, law enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and 
security agencies, and health agencies [3]. 
• Design basis threat (DBT): A comprehensive description of the motivations, intentions, and 
capabilities of potential adversaries against which protection systems are designed and 
evaluated [4]. 
• Sensitive information: Information, in whatever form, including software, that the unauthorized 
disclosure, modification, alteration, destruction, or denial of use of could compromise nuclear 
security [5]. 
• Threat assessment: An evaluation of the threats — based on available intelligence, law 
enforcement, and open material information — that describes the motivation, intentions, and 
capabilities of these threats [3]. 
• Threat statement: A document that summarizes the threat assessment and has been modified 
to account for policy considerations. The DBT is an example of a threat statement (developed 
after extensive consultation in Member States) [6]. 
• Threat information: To the extent the threat information is provided by the regulatory body, it 
describes the information in sufficient detail to indicate how the security system is designed to 
protect against both external and internal threats. Also indicates who is responsible for receiving 
threat information and how such information is shared with operator personnel who have a 
need to know [4]. 
 
In this paper, the term “threat information” expands to include details about potential terrorist groups, 
criminals, or insiders that have the intent and/or are capable of conducting a malicious act with 
radioactive materials. This may include, for example:  
 
• relevant information on the modus operandi or previous malicious acts 
• lessons learned from security events or incidents 
• security events or security information reported from competent authorities to operators and 
from operators to competent authorities 
• guidance to enhance readiness and situational awareness of users, operators, and/or security 
personnel 
3. International Threat Assessment Methods for 
Radioactive Materials 
This section describes practices recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 
conducting threat assessments for radioactive materials and how threat information may be integrated 
into regulatory frameworks. 
 
The Code of Conduct [1], the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 14 Nuclear Security 
Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities [3], and the revised IAEA NSS No. 11 
Security of Radioactive Materials [4] mention that the Member State can use a domestic or national 
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threat assessment to determine credible motivations, intentions, and the capabilities of potential 
adversaries that could cause harm through the sabotage of a facility or the unauthorized removal of a 
radioactive material for malicious purposes. The State is responsible for undertaking the task of 
conducting a threat assessment. Different methods exist for assessing the threats at a strategic, 
operational, and tactical level. However, there is not an international standard or agreed minimum level 
of threat. Also, there is not a common international threat assessment method regarding international 
transport for high-risk radioactive materials. Because the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely 
with the State, threats during international shipments of radioactive materials are harder to assess and 
must be considered in the shipment risk assessment. The responsibility for this risk assessment usually 
falls on the operator and must be verified and validated by the relevant competent authorities. 
 
The information from the Threat Assessment can be used by a competent authority, such as a regulatory 
body, during the development, implementation, and maintenance of the security regulations and 
requirements for radioactive materials. However, this threat information is usually not specific to 
facilities and sometimes is too generic to provide relevant and useful information to operators 
responsible for physical protection programs at facilities and for transport. 
 
Typically following a threat assessment, the Competent Authority will develop a design basis threat 
(DBT) to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The DBT is a rigorous process that includes 
consultation with multiple organizations. It provides threat information on the motivation, capabilities, 
modus operandi, and tools used by a potential external and/or insider adversary. Implementing a DBT 
for radioactive materials requires more resources and is difficult to maintain for countries that are in the 
process of developing their regulations and have limited resources. The DBTs are considered a classified 
document by national competent authorities; therefore, it cannot easily be shared with private 
organization operators without proper information security arrangements, nondisclosure agreements, 
contractual arrangements, or an equivalent safeguard. 
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In the proposed revision of NSS No. 11, the IAEA 
recognizes the existence of Representative Threat 
Statements (RTS). An RTS follows a similar process as 
the DBT but is more flexible. In both approaches, the 
DBT and RTS could be used in developing regulatory 
security requirements for radioactive materials and 
could achieve the same goal. Figure 1 shows how 
threat information is used to define requirements for 
security systems. 
 
In both cases, there are also commonalities in using 
threat information to characterize the credible threats. 
For example, both DBTs and the RTS use a threat 
matrix or threat profiles. The difference is that a state 
may decide to use a DBT for nuclear materials and an 
RTS for other radioactive materials. The DBT can be 
used to protect materials and the RTS for lower risk 
materials. Also, during their development process, 
both documents may involve different organizations 
that are more relevant to the type of material. 
According to the IAEA, an RTS is typically used to 
develop a more prescriptive regulatory approach and 
requirements. The RTS is also considered to follow a 
less rigorous process. 
 
Figure 2 is an example of a generic table of attributes 
and characteristics for hypothetical threats based on 
IAEA guidance documents and is not to be taken as a 
true illustration. 
 
Figure 1: IAEA Revised NSS 11 Process for Using Threat Information 
 
 











Disregard for personal health, safety, well-being, or 
survival (Choose from low to high.) 
High Medium Low 
Intentions Unauthorized removal, material or facility 
sabotage, public panic and disruption, political 
instability, mass injuries and casualties, loss of 
Sabotage and 
theft 
Theft Disruption of 
activities, media 
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reputation, unavailability of facilities, 
demonstrations (choose theft and/or sabotage) 
attention, business 
reputation 
Group size Attack force, coordination, support 5-8 8-10 10-20 








Tools Mechanical, thermal, manual, power, electronic, 








Modes of transport Land, water, air; type, number, availability Land, 4 x 4 Land, 4 x 4 Land, 4 x 4, rental 
truck 
Technical skills Engineering, use of explosives and chemicals, 
radiation protection, communication skills 
Basic, 
explosives  
Basic Basic knowledge of 
radiation 
protection 
Computer skills Skills to compromise computer systems and 
components and the availability, integrity, and 
confidentiality of the data processed, stored, or 
forwarded in computer systems and components 
Low Medium High (hacking 
likely) 
Knowledge Targets, site plans and procedures, security 
measures, safety and radiation protection 
procedures, operations, potential use of radioactive 
material 
Low Medium Low 
Funding Material, amount, availability $10,000  unknown Low, under  
$10,000  
Insider issues Collusion, passive/active, violent/nonviolent, 








Support structure Local sympathizers, support organization, logistics 
 





Tactics Covert and overt Both Covert Both 
Figure 2: Generic Table of Attributes and Characteristics for Hypothetical Threats based on IAEA NSS 14 and 11 
When developing security requirements for radioactive materials, a state may use a prescriptive 
approach, and the regulatory body may impose security requirements without sharing threat 
information with operators. A state may also wish to implement a performance-based approach where 
the responsibility of defining the threat and implementing mitigating measures is mostly on the 
operator. In this case, the operator has to submit their proposal to the competent authority and/or 
regulatory body for their approval. Operators are responsible to gather threat information from open 
materials, records of incidents, and from local police forces regarding local crime, past incident reports, 
or other sources of information. This can be a challenge for operators that do not have access to threat 
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information and have limited resources. Finally, States may choose to adopt a combined performance 
and prescriptive approach to protect radioactive materials. In all approaches, using threat information is 
a common vector, but there are challenges in sharing this information that will be explored in the 
following section. 
4. Challenges for Sharing Threat Information 
This section explores challenges for acquiring and sharing threat information between the different 
stakeholders, starting from the regulatory body to the operators’ level. 
A. National Sovereignty and National Security 
Information regarding threats to national security is usually treated as sensitive and classified 
information under national laws relevant to public safety and national security. External stakeholders, 
such as an operator’s staff, find it difficult to acquire threat information from the competent authority 
(e.g., national intelligence service, law enforcement agencies, regulatory body, etc.) because 
government rules for security clearance and requirements for handling secure information are not the 
same for the operators. The necessary level of security clearance, trustworthiness verification, and/or 
criminal background check required by national security regulations are directly related to the capability 
to receive, manage, and disseminate classified information on threats to radioactive materials. 
 
In addition to these difficulties, some countries have conducted sabotage studies, vulnerability 
assessments, and other sensitive research on radioactive material attractiveness that cannot be shared 
with stakeholders because of their confidentiality. These studies identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
and are classified to maintain national security and protect global security. 
B. Legal Provisions, Privacy Laws, and Regulations 
National laws and regulations on information security usually dictate how to label, classify, and manage 
information for government agencies and other competent authorities. These requirements apply to 
public organizations but not necessarily to operators using radioactive materials. In some States, there 
are legal provisions for copyright protection, trademarks, and intellectual property that can pose 
additional barriers for sharing information. 
 
Privacy laws and regulations can restrict the disclosure of private information with other organizations. 
All organizations are required to protect private information and implement protective measures to 
meet legal and regulatory requirements. 
C. Administrative Arrangements  
To protect threat information and maintain a trusting relationship among public and private 
organizations, contractual or written agreements are implemented between the parties for sharing 
sensitive information. Organizations may be required to implement memoranda of understanding and 
nondisclosure agreements as part of these arrangements. In addition, the competent authority or 
regulators must get consent from the owner of the information, usually a law enforcement organization, 
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before sharing it with private sector operators. These administrative and bureaucratic arrangements 
take effort and time to develop, implement, and maintain. They can slowdown the process for sharing 
timely sensitive threat information among stakeholders. 
D. Other Barriers and Challenges 
Challenges may also exist in sharing threat information within an organization. This can be caused by 
compartmentalization of classified information, business silos, poor security culture, and inadequate 
integration of security threats and risks in the organizational structure and the management decision 
process. 
 
For small companies or public facilities like hospitals or universities, the operators may not have 
adequate resources to assess their threat environment and integrate this information in their physical 
protection program. Other challenges include: 
• The presence of “optimism bias” contributes to the perception that this (i.e., threat to 
radioactive materials) won’t happen to “us,” making these additional efforts is not worth it or 
necessary.  
• Public sector operators, such as universities, hospitals and medical facilities, have a strong 
organizational structure of transparency.  
• Sharing information specific to one organization and compartmentalizing intelligence 
information with another: In some cases, the competent authority may decide to share threat 
information with one operator and not the entire industry to protect ongoing investigations and 
avoid spreading confidential information.  
• Over-classification of information results from the absence of guidance on classification and 
inconsistent handling requirements. Also, data or information deemed classified by one 
organization may be considered unclassified by another due to subjectivity or misinterpretation 
of classing rules. 
• Cleared individuals may lack experience in handling sensitive/confidential information resulting 
in them not understanding how to manage this information.  
• A security clearance from one operator may not be compatible with the standard and 
requirements from another operator.  
• The increasing use of the internet, emails, and electronic storage media and the need to protect 
confidentiality in a more digital environment is becoming more complex and expensive for some 
organizations. 
• The lack of security culture and awareness on how to handle classified and sensitive information 
 
According to Morris et al. (2013) [7], there appear to be several reasons for the failure to fully 
appreciate the threats, including: 
• The lack of a precedent leads to the assumption of low risk threat: “No one has successfully 
stolen a radioactive material and used it in a dirty bomb in a given state (or sabotaged a 
radioactive material in place).” 
8
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 6 [2020], No. 1, Art. 8
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.6, No.1, 2020 
 
• In a state without a nuclear program, there may be no institutional infrastructure or familiarity 
with the applicable analytical methods to conduct a national threat assessment, design basis 
threat, or equivalent threat definition for radioactive materials. 
• States which lack a significant domestic terrorist movement may simply adopt the view that “it 
can’t happen here.” 
• A common perception is that radioactive materials are self-protecting – an inaccurate view given 
the increase in suicidal terrorist attacks and the willingness of potential adversaries to accept a 
lethal radiation dose and that such lethal doses may not be sufficiently incapacitating to prevent 
theft or sabotage. There is a misbelief that radiation is a deterrent and helps to prevent 
unauthorized removal because it will incapacitate the adversary. This statement is false, since 
malicious actors are ready to sacrifice their lives to conduct their attacks and that the radiation 
dose they may get will not immediately incapacitate them.  
 
In addition to these challenges, the amount of effort and resources needed to share classified 
information with radioactive material operators is significant. It usually deters an organization’s leaders 
from investing in human and financial resources because there are no data on the return on investment 
and how it can benefit the organization. It is also hard to measure the effectiveness of these programs, 
and there is little research or studies on their impacts. Fortunately, there are opportunities for 
implementing a collaborative framework with industry to share threat information. There are also good 
practices between public and private organizations that strengthen vigilance and information sharing. In 
the next section, we will explore opportunities and share some good practices that can facilitate the 
sharing of classified information. 
5. Opportunities to Facilitate Sharing of Threat 
Information 
There are multiple benefits in establishing a collaborative framework for exchanging information 
between public and private organizations. 
 
Benefits 
Nuclear Regulator Radioactive Material Operators 
Increases communications and information 
sharing with industry representatives 
Assists in establishing a trusting relationship  
Encourages reporting of suspicious events 
Establishes more cooperation mechanism with 
relevant stakeholders 
Increases awareness of potential threats to 
operations 
Increases vigilance  
Provides additional information that can be used 
to influence decision makers or enhance security 
measures 
Provides additional material that could be used in 
training, drills, and exercises 
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Figure 3: Table of Direct Benefits 
Figure 3 identifies direct benefits for the regulator and the operators. There are also indirect benefits, 
such as increasing networking among security points of contacts, establishing cooperation against 
common threats or security issues, and increasing the knowledge and awareness of participants. The 
table excludes law enforcement agencies, custom border services, and security intelligence 
organizations since they already have established networks and mechanisms with private organizations 
to share threat information, including reporting of suspicious events. This is typically part of their 
intelligence mandate. 
 
Some of the barriers identified in section B cannot be easily changed because they are linked to national 
sovereignty. Privacy laws and regulations, legal provisions, national security directives, and policies have 
to be followed when handling classified information to protect the confidentiality, availability, and 
integrity of the information. Therefore, compliance with these rules is required and should set the 
foundation of all cooperation and coordination arrangements between the public and private 
organizations. 
 
To overcome institutionalized and administrative challenges for sharing sensitive or classified 
information, competent authorities can verify that persons receiving this information have a “need to 
know” based on their duties or related work activities. Also, they can require background checks, 
security clearance, or trustworthiness verification in accordance with national policy and be given 
guidance on how to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, there are other 
alternatives identified in the lists below. The list identifies current good practices that exist to facilitate 
sharing threat information at the State and operator levels. It is not an exhaustive list. The intent is to 
share practical examples and alternatives that can enhance cooperation and communication. 
E. Examples of Good Practices at the State Level 
Practices Descriptions and Examples 
Institutionalized cooperation 
and coordination agreements 
Establish good working relationships and arrangements to share 
sensitive information between the regulatory body and competent 
authorities, especially law enforcement and intelligence services. These 
arrangements can be formalized in a memorandum of understanding 
or other forms of written arrangements. Similar agreements can be 
implemented with industry operators or associations to share 
unclassified information. As a result, stakeholders follow national 
privacy laws and regulations as well as national security directives and 





In some states, multiple government programs require criminal 
background checks. This may be considered as equivalent to 
trustworthiness verification for operators. For example, as part of CNSC 
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requirements, an individual that has unescorted access to high-risk 
radioactive sources needs to have a trustworthiness verification that 
includes a criminal record name check. This requirement also 
recognizes trusted travelers that undergo an FBI fingerprint verification 
and have a NEXUS card, or individuals that undergo criminal record 





program for private industry 
In Canada and the USA, there is the Information Sharing Network for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection that has programs to sponsor security 
clearance application from designated members of the industry with a 
security responsibility.  
 
The nuclear regulator may also sponsor private organization security 
clearance if they have a contractual agreement.  
 
Establishing a National 
Nuclear Security Committee 
and/or working groups 
radioactive material security 
Many States have national security committees that include 
representatives of industry operators and industry associations to 
increase the collaboration, cooperation, communication, and 
information for sharing on potential threats.   
 
Participate with international 
and national networks that 
include industry 
representatives  
There are many international organizations, such as IAEA, INTERPOL, 
Nuclear Security Contact Group, or state intelligence/policing services. 
Consideration should be given to using existing information sharing 
networks on radioactive materials. For example: Joining the IAEA 
Incident Trafficking database (ITDB), participating in the IAEA Working 
Group on Radioactive Material Security for national nuclear regulators, 
International Sealed Sources Suppliers and Producers Association 
(ISSPA),  industry radiography associations, World Nuclear Transport 
Institute, etc.  
 
There are also national industry associations that can be leveraged to 
share information on recent nuclear security events, lessons learned, 
and good practices. During these meetings, the competent authority 
(ex: regulator or law enforcement agency) can provide unclassified 
information on current and emerging threats that can have an impact 
on operators.  
11
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consultation to disseminate 
unclassified threat 
information  
Conduct outreach and communication with relevant stakeholders 
periodically or on a regular basis with regard to threat information. 
This outreach can include annual or semi-annual intelligence 
discussions for staff and industry, conducted at the classified and/or 
unclassified level for stakeholder groups. Industry associations can 
invite representatives from the regulatory body and law enforcement 
to get updates on national threats or events that can have an impact 
on their operations.  
 
Declassify sensitive 
information to an unclassified 
level 
To be able to share threat information, law enforcement and 
intelligence services invest efforts in removing sensitive details and 
personal data to share unclassified information. This method is widely 
used to share laterally with other public law enforcement/government 
organizations and horizontally with industry security representatives or 
senior policy/decision makers. This is one of the most effective means 
of sharing threat information in a timely manner.  
 
For international transport, 
establish 
bilateral/regional/multilateral 
agreements for sharing 
information between states 
Recognition and promotion of cross-border security programs should 
be considered; for example, the Canada-USA-Mexico CT-PAT/PIP 
program provides benefits to members by getting access to security 
assessments and awareness sessions and facilitates international 
transport of radioactive materials across borders. 
 
Use pre-established communication methods with the Foreign Affairs 
Service for notification of international shipments. For example, 
embassy/diplomatic foreign affairs communication channels could be 
used to notify states when a shipment of category 1 radioactive 
material occurs that impacts their region. 
 
Example: Advance notification of maritime transport shipments to 
coastal states – using IAEA networks and nuclear security points of 
contacts for international information request. 
 
Example of Good Practices at the Operator Level 
Practice Description and example 
12
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 6 [2020], No. 1, Art. 8
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.6, No.1, 2020 
 
Implement an effective 
security program to protect 
radioactive materials and 
sensitive information  
 
• Comply with national laws, regulations, and security 
requirements 
• Conduct a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment 
• Establish security and contingency plans 
• Implement security policies and procedures  
• Use the information from the national DBT or RTS to assess the 
effectiveness of physical protection measures  
• Establish drills and exercises program 
• Implement a security awareness program and training  
• Promote nuclear security culture  
• Report nuclear security events and other suspicious incidents 
 
Participate industry contact 
groups, outreach activities, 
teleconferences, and 
workshops relevant to 
nuclear security for 
radioactive materials 
 
These industry associations already exist and are very useful forums to 
exchange information. For example: International Sealed Sources 
Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA), Candu Owner Group 
(COG), and Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). There are also 
associations for specific industry groups, such as the Canadian Industrial 
radiography association (CIRCA), Canadian Radiation Protection 
Association (CRPA), etc. In some instance, these groups share sensitive 
information among stakeholders, including newsletters and bulletins.  
 
Designate or delegate one 
individual or team on how to 
handle classified information 
 
 
A private organization can identify, train, and designate one security 
point of contact. This function can also be delegated to another support 
group within the organization. This designated officer can undergo the 
security clearance process (e.g. trustworthiness verification) to be able 
to receive information from other organizations. 
 
Designate a security 
outreach officer or point of 
contact (e.g. liaison officer) 
 
Some organizations designate a security outreach officer to promote 
good security culture within the organization. 
Consult and communicate 
with local law enforcement 
agencies 
The local law enforcement agency can provide valuable support, 
including information on local crimes and threats. They often publish 
reports and criminal statistics, and they can be very useful for alerting 
the population in case of life-threatening events. 
 
13
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Leverage open source 
information on nuclear 
security  
Hire a consultant or analyst or use open source information software 
and tools to gather relevant information on threats to physical, cyber, 
and personal assets in the nuclear industry. 
 
 
As mentioned by the World Institute on Nuclear Security [8], “It is the State’s responsibility to obtain, 
collate and analyze threat information and ensure it is comprehensive and up-to-date. However, 
operators also have valuable contributions to make to the threat assessment due to their specialized 
knowledge of transport routes and potential problem areas that should be avoided; consequently, they 
should be encouraged to contribute to the process.”  The IAEA also published important guidance for 
States on the security of nuclear information [5] This document identifies specific considerations for 
sharing and disclosing sensitive information. An important guiding principle is the need to balance the 
benefit of sharing the information and the need for security. This is a golden rule to ensure organizations 
share relevant, accurate, and timely information without compromising confidentiality. 
 
Another good practice is getting law enforcement organizations involved and increasing their awareness 
regarding the risks and threats to radioactive materials. Law enforcement communities are a great 
resource to share threat information. They are an important player in the nuclear security regime for 
response. Typically, law enforcement organizations have competing priorities and need to risk manage 
their resources. Operators may find it difficult to communicate with the right law enforcement officer or 
to get them involved in alarm response training or site familiarization. The regulator, as a public and 
governmental organization, can greatly influence the relationships with police and security forces. To 
follow international recommendations, national competent authorities should require operators to 
establish arrangements with local law enforcement agencies to facilitate alarm response and to ensure 
timely and effective deployment in case of a security event. As mentioned by Mr. John Buchanan [9] 
from the radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention unit with Interpol, “Building relationships with all 
law enforcement stakeholders to fight the illicit smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials is 
essential.” From his perspective, it is important to develop networks and connections and to strengthen 
multiagency partnerships to protect nuclear and other radioactive materials. 
6. Analysis and Thoughts 
The establishment of a “Nuclear Security Culture” is based on a belief that the threat is real and credible. 
Therefore, it is important that stakeholders are engaged in this discussion and establish industry contact 
groups. An important element of information sharing moves from the state to the operator, but just as 
important is information sharing from the operator to the state. For example, it is critical to share 
lessons learned from security incidents to enable competent authorities to collect and compile national 
threat data and analyze trends, methods, relationships, and hot spots. Security incident reporting by 
operators should be encouraged and/or required by the state through regulation. Outreach with the 
industry can also be used to share information on radioactive material security and to increase 
awareness of relevant stakeholders and decision makers without compromising confidentiality 
requirements 
14
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To help users and operators understand what they are protecting against, it is necessary to inform and 
educate them about the threats. Radioactive materials are used worldwide in several medical, research, 
and industrial sectors; the regulator should focus efforts to target these specific industries and 
associations to develop their networks. Communication already exists with licensing and compliance 
programs; therefore, nuclear security should be part of the overall communication strategy with 
operators. 
 
When competent authorities communicate with operators to share relevant and accurate threat 
information effectively, it is important to set objectives and measure their effectiveness to report to 
senior and executive managers. This can include direct and indirect benefits in building trustful 
relationships with relevant stakeholders. 
 
Operators need to stay vigilant and informed on the motivation, intention, and capacity of the 
adversary. Cooperation in this aspect through timely and continuous sharing and dissemination of threat 
information is of particular importance to improve radiological security. 
To increase prevention and detection of potential adversary attacks on radioactive materials, it is 
necessary to test the capacity to share threat information with relevant stakeholders in an effective and 
timely manner through regular training, drills, or tabletop exercises. These communication channels are 
crucial when a reported security incident occurs, and they help to keep stakeholders and the public 
informed. 
 
Finally, to enhance the relationship between nuclear regulators, competent authorities and industry 
representatives, in particular operators handling high-risk radioactive materials in the private sector, 
should implement institutionalized coordination and cooperation mechanisms. Theses forums should 
use contractual relationships [10] with written agreements and a formal memorandum of understanding 
to facilitate the exchange of threat information and promote nuclear security culture, good practices, 
and lessons learned among relevant industry stakeholders and front-line response organizations. 
 
Communication, coordination, and cooperation are usually shared responsibilities among nuclear 
security stakeholders. Therefore, there is a need to unify efforts, get leadership support, and invest 
resources at the national level to make a positive change and to strengthen communicating threat 
information. These “3 C” principles were identified as keys to secure radioactive material globally at the 
International Nuclear Security Conference highlights in 2018.  It may be time to move from a “need to 
know” approach to a “need to share” threat information between competent authorities and 
radioactive materials operators to strengthen communication and trust as well as empower further 
cooperation for nuclear security. 
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